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The "Works Made for Hire" Doctrine
and the Employee/Independent
Contractor Dichotomy: The Need
for Congressional Clarification
by BENNETT J. FIDLOW*
Introduction
Perhaps the most basic element of copyright law is the con-
cept that an author is entitled to protection for his work. This
right is wholly a creation of federal statute and is given sub-
stance by Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution,.)
which vests in Congress the power "[t]o promote the progress
of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to au-
thors ... the exclusive right to their... writings ..... - Pursu-
ant to this power, Congress enacted the first Copyright Act in
1790.2 The nearly two intervening centuries have witnessed
several revisions in copyright law, 3 which are now codified in
the Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act).4
Unfortunately, application of copyright law has always been
complicated by a basic definitional uncertainty. Section 201 of
the 1976 Act recognizes that copyright ownership vests in the
* B.F.A., Carnegie-Mellon University, 1983; M.F.A., Columbia University (the-
sis pending); Member, Third Year Class.
An earlier version of this note received the first place award in the 1987 Nathan
Burkan Memorial Copyright Competition at Hastings College of the Law sponsored
by the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP).
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914
(1982 & Supp. III 1985).
3. There have been four major revisions of the Copyright Act: Act of Feb. 3,
1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436; Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 320, 16 Stat. 198; Act of March 4, 1909,
Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 [hereinafter 1909 Act]; Act of Oct. 19, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 [hereinafter 1976 Act or 17 U.S.C.]; see H.R. REP. No.
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
(90 Stat.) 5659 (history of the 1976 revision) [hereinafter Legislative History]. See also
S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (which is substantially identical to the
House Report).
4. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) as amended by Act of Nov. 8, 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3356.
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author of a work,5 but nowhere in the Act, or in past Acts, is
there a definition of "author."6 On its face, this does not seem
to be a serious problem since the meaning appears obvious: the
author should be the person who creates the work.7 However,
the Copyright Act itself precludes such a simplistic construc-
tion since, in some instances, it requires that copyright protec-
tion be given to a person other than the creator.' The confusion
resulting from this apparently paradoxical situation has gener-
ated a body of law known as the "works made for hire" doc-
trine, which attempts to deal with the problem of determining
copyright ownership of a work created by one party at the be-
hest of another party.9 The doctrine is described in the 1976
Act by section 201(b), which reads:
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other per-
son for whom the work was prepared is considered the author
for purposes of [ownership of copyright], and, unless the par-
ties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument
signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the
copyright.1"
Although the omission of a statutory definition of "author"
may seem relatively harmless, it opens the door for ambiguity
and interpretation. When coupled with the uncertainty in ap-
plying the "works made for hire" doctrine,11 due to its own lack
of definitional clarity, the resulting confusion has generated
volumes of writings, reports, studies, committee prints, hearing
5. The pertinent part of § 201 reads "[c]opyright in a work protected under this
title vests initially in the author or authors of the work." 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982).
6. Section 101 of the 1976 Act, headed "Definitions," does not list the term "au-
thor." See 17 U.S.C. § 101. Section 26 of the 1909 Act, headed "Terms Defined," only
mentions "author" to say that the word "shall include an employer in the case of a
work made for hire." See 1909 Act § 26. This same use of the word "author" is in-
cluded in the 1976 Act in § 201(b), but no additional definition is offered. 17 U.S.C.
§ 201(b).
7. In 1884, the U.S. Supreme Court looked at the problem created by the lack of
a statutory definition for the term "author" and quoted with approval the definition
"he to whom anything owes its origin; origination; maker. Burrow-Giles Litho-
graphic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
8.' In certain situations, the 1976 Act requires that the employer of the creator be
considered the author and therefore be granted ownership rights in the work. See,
e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 304(a) (1982).
9. This is not to be confused with the situation in which one party works with
another party in creating the work. This would result in a "joint work." See id.
88 101, 201(a), 302(b).
10. Id. § 201(b).
11. See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
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notes, and bill proposals,12 as well as a large body of case law.13
All of these works,.academic, legislative and judicial, have at-
tempted to set guidelines for establishing copyright ownership
in light of these definitional omissions; none, however, have
been entirely successful. The confusion that still exists is the
focus of this note.
The 1976 Act bases several important ownership issues on
whether or not a work is classified as "made for hire." They
are: 1. initial ownership protection; 4 2. copyright duration; 5 3.
renewal rights;' 6 and 4. termination rights. 7
1. Initial Ownership Protection. As previously mentioned,
ownership protection is granted to authors in section 201(a),'"
however, the author of a "work made for hire" is the employer,
not the creator of the work.' 9
2. Copyright Duration. As stated in the U.S. Constitution,
copyright protection is granted for only a limited time.20 In a
work created on or after January 1, 1978 (the date on which the
12. See generally 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03, at 5-10 to 5-31
(1986); Note, The Works Made for Hire Doctrine of the 1976 Copyright Act After
Aldon Accessories v. Spiegel, Inc., 5 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 265 (1986); Deutsch,
Works for Hire, and Other Ownership Questions, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
COPYRIGHT LAW 437 (1986); O'Meara, 'Works Made for Hire' Under the Copyright Act
of 1976 - Two Interpretations, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 523 (1982); Angel & Tannen-
baum, Works Made for Hire Under S. 22, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 209 (1976), reprinted
in NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE NEW COPY-
RIGHT LAW 29 (1977); STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG.,
2D SESS., STUDY No. 13, WORKS MADE FOR HIRE AND ON COMMISSION 142 (Comm.
Print 1960) [hereinafter STUDY No. 13], reprinted in 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 717 (A.
Fisher mem. ed. 1963); STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D
SESS., 537 (Comm. print 1960) [hereinafter STUDY No. 31] reprinted in 1 STUDIES ON
COPYRIGHT 533 (A. Fisher mem. ed. 1963). As a source of specific legislative history,
see 3 THE KAMINSTEIN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY PROJECT: A COMPENDIUM AND ANALYTI-
CAL INDEX OF MATERIALS LEADING TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976 327-77 (A. Latman
& J. Lightstone ed. 1983) [hereinafter KAMINSTEIN] and Legislative History, supra
note 3.
13. For a history of the case law development of the doctrine, see Easter Seal
Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 325-34 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 820 F.2d 1223
(5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3338 (1987) (inviting Solicitor General's
brief expressing view of the United States).
14. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982).
15. Id. § 302(c).
16. Id. § 304(a).
17. Id. § 203(a).
18. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b).
20. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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1976 Act took effect), copyright protection remains in force for
a period equal to the life of the author plus fifty years.21 If this
same work has been classified as "made for hire," however, the
protection lasts "for a term of seventy-five years from the year
of its first publication, or a term of one hundred years from the
year of its creation, whichever expires first."22
3. Renewal Rights. If the work was created before January 1,
1978, the copyright must be renewed in order to extend the pro-
tection to approximate the new duration dates set by the 1976
Act.23 In most instances, the author is entitled to a renewal and
extension. In a "work made for hire" situation, however, the
employer is considered the author; it is therefore the employer,
not the creator, who is entitled to these rights.24
4. Termination Rights. When the rights to a work are trans-
ferred or licensed to another party, the copyright statute pro-
vides that the author may terminate the grant or license after
thirty-five years.25 If a work is classified as "made for hire,"
however, it is not subject to termination. 26
Section 101 of the 1976 Act 27 defines a "work made for hire"
as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or
her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a con-
tribution to a collective work, [28 ] as a part of a motion pic-
ture 29] or other audiovisual work, 30 1 as a translation, as a
21. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
22. Id. § 302(c).
23. See id. § 304(a).
24. Id. For further discussion of copyright renewals in "works made for hire," see
Angel & Tannenbaum, supra note 12, at 216-21; STUDY No. 31, supra note 12.
25. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a).
26. Id.
27. Id. § 101.
28. Section 101 defines a "collective work" as "a work, such as a periodical issue,
anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate
and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole." Id.
29. Section 101 defines "motion pictures" as "audiovisual works consisting of a
series of related images which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of
motion, together with accompanying sounds, if any." Id.
30. Section 101 defines "audiovisual works" as:
works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically in-
tended to be shown by the use of machines or devices such as projectors,
viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any,
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supplementary work,3 11 as a compilation, [321 as an instruc-
tional text,[331 as a test, as answer material for a test, or as
an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instru-
ment signed by them that the work shall be considered a
work made for hire.
[34
1
Subsection (1) of the above definition, concerning employee
works, has long been recognized and respected as viable;35 sub-
section (2), dealing with commissioned works, however, has en-
gendered critical and interpretive conflict throughout its
history. 6 This subsection can have devastating results for an
independent contractor who is "specially ordered or commis-
sioned" to create a work since, if the work is classified as "made
for hire," he is forced to give up all of the copyright protections.
The specific problem addressed by this analysis centers
around the fact that the wording of the "work made for hire"
definition was substantially revised in the 1976 Act.37 Some ar-
gue that this was done to allow added protection to the in-
dependent contractor by removing the old presumption that
regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in
which the works are embodied.
Id.
31. Section 101 defines a "supplementary work" as:
a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another
author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, re-
vising, commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as
forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial
notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, ap-
pendixes, and indexes....
Id.
32. Section 101 defines a "compilation" as "a work formed by the collection and
assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or ar-
ranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work
of authorship. The term 'compilation' includes collective works." Id.
33. Section 101 defines an "instructional text" as "a literary, pictorial, or graphic
work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional
activities." Id. See also Legislative History, supra note 3, at 121.
34. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
35. See, e.g., Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984); Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188
U.S. 239 (1903). See also Legislative History, supra note 3, at 121.
36. See, e.g., Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir.), reh'g
denied 820 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3338 (1987) (invit-
ing Solicitor General's brief expressing view of the United States); Dielman v. White,
102 F. 892 (C.C.D. Mass. 1900).
37. See Legislative History, supra note 3, at 121.
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copyright automatically vested in the commissioning party.3
Others disagree, saying that the revision was meant to be a clar-
ification and not a drastic change in the methods of determin-
ing copyright ownership.39
Recently, a conflict among several of the federal circuit
courts has reflected these opposing views.4 ° The Second Cir-
cuit, in 1984, ruled in favor of the latter, more conservative
view in Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.41 and was fol-
lowed in 1986 by the Seventh Circuit in Evans Newton, Inc. v.
Chicago Systems Software.42 Most recently, in April 1987, the
Fifth Circuit announced its decision in Easter Seal Society v.
Playboy Enterprises,43 which strongly opposes the Aldon
view.44 Although this case seems to be fairly isolated, its rea-
soning is persuasive and is the foundation of the viewpoint
adopted by this note. The United States Supreme Court has
also shown some interest in the Easter Seal Society case. On
November 9, 1987, the Court invited the Solicitor General to
file a brief expressing the position of the United States;45 ac-
cordingly, the Court may soon attempt to judicially clarify the
current ambiguity in the copyright statute by resolving the op-
posing circuit opinions.
Section I of this note discusses the history of the "works
made for hire" doctrine and the problems associated with it up
through the 1976 statutory revision. Section II reviews the cur-
rent variations in statutory interpretation and the opposing cir-
cuit court rulings. Section III looks at the attempts since 1976
at correcting the "works made for hire" confusion through fur-
38. See 1. M. NIMMER, supra note 12, § 5.03, at 5-10; N. BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT
LAW, § 3.3, at 85 (1981 & Supp. 1986); Angel & Tannenbaum, supra note 12, at 209, 239.
39. See O'Meara, supra note 12, at 525. O'Meara termed this view "conservative."
Id. at 527. See also Aldon, 738 F.2d at 551-53. The opposing view, supported by Mel-
ville Nimmer, was termed by O'Meara as the "radical" view since it called for a radical
departure from the pre-1976 Act interpretation. See O'Meara, supra note 12, at 527.
40. See, e.g., Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 323; Aldon, 738 F.2d at 548; Evans
Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
434 (1986).
41. The court in Aldon upheld the trial judge's jury instruction, which stated in
part, "It does not matter whether the for-hire creator is an employee in the sense of
having a regular job with the hiring author. What matters is whether the hiring au-
thor caused the work to be made and exercised the right to direct and supervise the
creation." Aldon, 738 F.2d at 551.
42. Evans Newton, 793 F.2d at 894 n.5.
43. Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 334-35.
44. See infra notes 164-79 and accompanying text.
45. Easter Seal Soc'y, petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3338 (1987).
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ther statutory revision. This note concludes that although the
U.S. Supreme Court may unify the current application of the
doctrine, the best solution is for Congress to amend the Copy-
right Act to include workable definitions which would more
clearly differentiate between an employee working "within the
scope of his or her employment" and an independent contrac-
tor creating "a work specially ordered or commissioned."
I
History of the Doctrine
A. The 1909 Act and the Courts
Although Congress enacted the first copyright law in 1790,46
the basic concepts embodied in the "works made for hire" doc-
trine were not officially recognized until the early 1900's. In
1903 the Supreme Court, in Bleistein v. Donaldson Litho-
graphing Co., 47 stated that an employer owned the copyright to
advertisements which had been created by an employee in the
course of his employment.48 Although ownership of the copy-
right by the employer was not the major issue in the case, later
cases and commentators point to Bleistein as the origin of the
"works made for hire" doctrine. 9
The rule that employers owned the copyright in works cre-
ated by their employees was first codified six years after Bleis-
tein in the Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act).5" The statute
accomplished this by providing that "the word 'author' shall in-
46. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
47. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
48. Id. at 248. In the opinion, written by Justice Holmes, the Court stated, "There
was evidence warranting the inference that the designs belonged to the plaintiffs,
they having been produced by persons employed and paid by the plaintiffs in their
establishment to make those very things." Id.
49. See, e.g., Simon, Faculty Writings: Are They 'Works Made for Hire' Under the
1976 Copyright Act?, 9 J. C. & U. L. 485, 487 (1982-83); After Aldon, supra note 12, at
268; Real Estate Data, Inc. v. Sidwell Co., 809 F.2d 366, 371 (7th Cir. 1987); Murray v.
Gelderman, 566 F.2d 1307, 1309 (5th Cir. 1978); Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417
F.2d 497, 500 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970); Brattleboro Publishing
Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 567 (2d Cir. 1966); Tobani v. Carl
Fischer, Inc., 98 F.2d 57, 59 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 650 (1938); Brown v. Molle
Co., 20 F. Supp. 135, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
50. See supra note 3. For an analysis of the applications of the "works made for
hire" doctrine under the 1909 Act see Annotation, Application of "Works for Hire"
Doctrine Under Federal Copyright Act (17 US.C. §§1 et seq.), 11 A.L.R. FED. 457
(1972).
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clude an employer in the case of works made for hire,"'51
thereby giving employers all of the copyright ownership rights
usually reserved for the creator of a work. The only other sec-
tion of the 1909 Act dealing with the employer-employee rela-
tionship was the provision for copyright renewal.5 2
By specifically setting off "works made for hire" as a separate
category of copyrightable material, Congress made it crucial, in
determining both ownership and renewal rights, to define the
original relationship between the creator and anyone with
whom he may have worked in commercially exploiting his cre-
ation. Unfortunately, the 1909 Act did not define "employee"
or "works made for hire,"5 3 and the legislative history of the
Act offers little guidance in this area.54 The courts, therefore,
had to determine the factual relationship between the parties
in each case, thereby judicially defining the limits of the
"works made for hire" doctrine on a case-by-case basis.
When deciding "works made for hire" cases, courts followed
the principle set out in Bleistein, which held that proof indicat-
ing that employers owned the copyright in works created by
their employees5 5 was a rebuttable presumption rather than a
conclusive one.56 It was also established that the employer
need not actually participate in the creation process to obtain
copyright ownership. This was expressed in a leading case in-
volving renewal rights in works made "for hire," Shapiro,
Bernstein & Co. v. Bryan.57 In Shapiro, Judge Learned Hand
51. 1909 Act § 26.
52. Id. § 24. Normally renewal rights remained with the creator of the work even
if he had previously contracted away his rights. The pertinent part of section 24 reads,
"[Iln the case of any.., copyrighted works.... the author of such work... shall be
entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright .. " Id. In the case of a work
considered "made for hire," however, the employer was entitled to the renewal. The
part of section 24 which referred to "works made for hire" reads, "[I]n the case of any
... work upon which the copyright was originally secured .. .by an employer for
whom such work [was] made for hire, the proprietor of such copyright shall be enti-
tled to a renewal and extension ..." Id. For further discussion of the renewal provi-
sions, see generally supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
53. See 1909 Act § 26. See also STUDY No. 13, supra note 12, at 128; OMeara, supra
note 12, at 524; Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 325.
54. See, e.g., STUDY No. 13, supra note 12, at 128.
55. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 325-27; Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne,
Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972); Brattleboro Pub-
lishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 567 (2d Cir. 1966).
57. 123 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1941).
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considered the scope of the "works made for hire" doctrine,
finding:
[Although the employees] argue that that phrase [works made
for hire] does not include works of which employees are the
real authors, but only those to which they make some ancillary
contribution to the "employer" who is the chief author, ...
[t]he words [of the 1909 statute] suggest no such
distinction.... 8
As the case law developed, the courts established a set of
standards to use when testing for the employment relationship.
The most important standard that developed was the right of
the employer to exercise supervision and control over the
work. This was described as the "hallmark" of the "employ-
ment for hire" relationship.59 As the Second Circuit - the de
facto copyright court in the United States" - explained in
Scherr v. Universal Match Corp. :61
The essential factor in determining whether an employee cre-
ated his work of art within the scope of his employment.., is
whether the employer possessed the right to direct and to su-
pervise the manner in which the work was being performed 621
Other pertinent, but non-essential, considerations, are those
indicating at whose insistence, expense, time and facilities the
work was created.[63 Additionally, the nature and amount of
compensation [if any] received by the employee... may be con-
sidered; [64 but ... it is of minor relevance.
[ 65
58. Id. at 700. See also Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 326 n.7 (citing Picture Music
as saying that it is the theoretical right to direct and supervise an employee's work
which makes it "for hire").
59. Epoch Producing Corp. v. Killiam Shows, 522 F.2d 737, 744 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976); see generally 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 12, § 5.03[B] at 5-21
n.18; N. BOORSTYN, supra note 38, at 84.
60. See Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 325 (describing the Second Circuit's well-
known reputation for copyright decisions).
61. 417 F.2d 497, 500 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970).
62. Id. at 500; Picture Music, 457 F.2d at 1216; see generally 11 A.L.R. FED. 457,
supra note 50, § 5(a).
63. See, e.g., Scherr, 417 F.2d at 500; Brattleboro, 369 F.2d at 568; Picture Music, 457
F.2d at 1216; Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298, 300 (9th Cir. 1965);
see generally 11 A.L.R. FED. 457, supra note 50, § 5(b).
64. See, e.g., Tobani v. Carl Fischer, Inc., 98 F.2d 57, 59-60 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
305 U.S. 650 (1938); Scherr, 417 F.2d at 500; Donaldson Publishing Co. v. Bregman,
Vocco & Conn, Inc., 375 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1036 (1968);
Picture Music, 457 F.2d at 1216; see generally 11 A.L.R. FED. 457, supra note 50 § 5(c).
65. See Scherr, 417 F.2d at 500-01 (citing M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 62.2 (1968)).
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B. The Independent Contractor Problem
The effect of the "works made for hire" doctrine regarding
employees was unclear, with respect to the status of a work cre-
ated by an independent contractor. The independent contrac-
tor relationship is similar, but not identical, to the settled
employer-employee relationship. A contractor is under some
obligation to the commissioning party, but not as a full em-
ployee. Usually, the contractor works under different condi-
tions and on a less formal basis than an employee. In return,
the commissioning party avoids the obligation of providing ben-
efits to the contractor which are normally provided for employ-
ees, such as a regular salary and insurance coverage.66 The 1909
Act and its legislative history do not mention independent
contractors.67
As early as 1900, the courts had articulated the rule that com-
missioned art works were presumed to belong totally to the hir-
ing party:68
In general when an artist is commissioned to execute a work of
art not in existence at the time the commission is given, the
burden of proving that he retains a copyright in the work of art
executed, sold, and delivered under the commission rests heav-
ily upon the artist himself. If a patron gives a commission to an
artist, there appears.., a very strong implication that the work
of art commissioned is to belong unreservedly and without lim-
itation to the patron.69
The early cases presumed that the copyrights were assigned to
the patron and did not rely on a "made for hire" theory;7 ° how-
66. The types of employment benefits mandated by law vary from state to state.
In many states, employers are required to pay for workers' compensation programs,
unemployment insurance, social security taxes, and retirement plans. In California,
for example, see CAL. LABOR CODE § 227 (West Supp. 1987) (pension fund payments),
and § 3600 (workers' compensation), as well as CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 601-2113
(West Supp. 1987) (unemployment insurance).
67. See 1909 Act § 26. See also STUDY No. 13, supra note 12, at 128; OMeara, supra
note 12, at 524; Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 325.
68. Dielman v. White, 102 F. 892 (C.C.D. Mass. 1900).
69. Id. at 894.
70. See, e.g., id. at 892; Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939),
cert. denied, 309 U.S. 686 (1940); Lumiere v. Robertson-Cole Distrib. Corp., 280 F. 550
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 583 (1922). This is best seen in Yardley. where the
court ruled that "if an [artist] is solicited by a patron to execute a commission for pay,
the presumption should be indulged that the patron desires to control the publication
of copies and that the artist consents. . . ." Id. at 31 (emphasis added). The distinction
between ownership by "consent" (resulting in an assignment) and initial ownership
by operation of statute (resulting in a classification as a "work made for hire") should
not be overlooked. See Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 326.
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ever, later courts often confused the distinction and treated
works made by contractors as the equivalent of works made by
employees in the course of their employment. Both were con-
sidered "works made for hire. '7
1
It was not until 1966 that a court expressly used the "works
made for hire" doctrine to decide an independent contractor
case. In Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing
Corp.,72 the Second Circuit created a new expanded definition
of the "works made for hire" doctrine by summarizing the ex-
isting employer-employee copyright ownership presumption
and then stating that it saw "no sound reason why these same
principles are not applicable when the parties bear the relation-
ship of employer and independent contractor. 7 3 With this new
interpretation, the "works made for hire" doctrine stood for the
presumption that copyright ownership automatically vested in
the employer or the hiring party because of his right to control
the work, although no actual control had to be asserted. 4
Although the Brattleboro court might have expected its judi-
cial extension of the "works made for hire" presumption to
solve the copyright ownership questions in the independent
contractor area, it did not.7 5 The independent contractor anom-
aly was considered in the revision of the copyright statute.
C. The Legislative History
Suggestions for the revision of copyright law in the "works
made for hire" area date back to the early 1900's.77 However, it
was not until the mid-1950's that efforts were successful in re-
71. See, e.g., Picture Music, 457 F.2d at 1216-17; Brattleboro, 369 F.2d at 567-68.
For example, the court in Picture Music refused to consider the differences between
employees and contractors, saying that "the purpose of the [1909] statute is not to be
frustrated by conceptualistic formulations of the employment relationship.... That
[the creator] acted in the capacity of an independent contractor does not preclude a
finding that the [work] was done for hire." Picture Music, 457 F.2d at 1216-17.
72. 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966).
73. Id. at 568 (citing Yardley); but see id. at 569 (Lombard, C.J. concurring).
74. See Picture Music, 457 F.2d at 1216 (citing Brattleboro and Yardley). See also
Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 326.
75. See, e.g., Scherr, 417 F.2d at 502 (Friendly, J., dissenting). See also Easter Seal
Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 323; Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
76. Evidence of the independent contractor anomaly consideration is apparent in
the various studies on the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act, supra note 12
(discussed below).
77. See STUDY No. 13, supra note 12, at 128 n.4. See also infra notes 111-12 and
accompanying text.
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vising the statute, sweeping aside the common law through
which the courts had interpreted the "works made for hire"
doctrine. As a result of the United States becoming a party to
the Universal Copyright Convention, interest grew in revising
the U.S. Copyright Law. Through the Legislative Appropria-
tions Act of 1955, Congress ordered a series of thirty-five stud-
ies on most of the substantive issues for copyright revision.7"
The 1958 report, known as Study No. 13 and entitled Works
Made For Hire and on Commission,79 was one of the first re-
ports to consider separate treatment of independent contrac-
tors.8" The report was a comprehensive study of the legislative
history and court decisions as well as a commentary on relevant
foreign law.
The study showed that there had been many attempts to
change the treatment of works made for hire and on commis-
sion after the passage of the 1909 Act.81 It examined the nu-
merous bills which had been proposed to Congress over the
years, 2 all of which contained variations and explanations
which were similar to the sections eventually enacted in 1976.
The study also analyzed the basic issues underlying the pres-
sure for revision and suggested some solutions.8 One of the
suggestions centered around the analogous use of the "shop
right" doctrine in patent law.8 4 The study described this doc-
78. See generally Hearings on H.R. 9203 Before the Subcomm. on Appropriations
of the United States Senate Making Appropriations for the Legislative Branch and the
Judiciary Branch for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1955, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1955).
See also O'Meara, supra note 12, at 526.
79. STUDY No. 13, supra note 12.
80. Id. at 142.
81. Id. at 130-35.
82. H.R. 8177, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924) (the Dallinger Bill), modified in H.R.
9137, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924) (considered briefly ifi Hearings on H.R. 6250 and
H.R. 9137 Before The House Comm. on Patents, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924)); H.R.
11258, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. (1925) (the Perkins Bill) (considered in Hearings on H.R.
11258 Before the House Comm. on Patents, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. (1925)); H.R. 10434,
69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926) (the Vestal Bill), modified in H.R. 12549, 71st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1930) (passed by the House, but rejected in Hearings on H.R. 12549 Before the
Senate Comm. on Patents, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1931)); H.R. 10364, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1932) (the Sirovich Bill) (considered in Hearings on the General Revision of the
Copyright Law Before the House Comm. on Patents, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932)); S.
2465, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) (the Duffy Bill); H.R. 10632, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936) (the Daly Bill). (The Duffy, Daly, and Sirovich bills were considered in lengthy
hearings in Hearings on Revision of the Copyright Laws Before the House Comm. on
Patents, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); S. 3043, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) (the Thomas
Bill)).
83. STUDY No. 13, supra note 12, at 139-43.
84. See id. at 140; see also infra notes 104, 108-10 and accompanying text.
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trine as being "in the nature of an implied nonexclusive license
[given to the employer] to utilize the patent [owned by the em-
ployee] throughout the term of protection. '8 5
Prior to its publication, copies of the study were sent to sev-
eral copyright authorities of the day, asking for their responses
and suggestions. Most of the responses stated that no change in
the law concerning "works made for hire" was warranted, and
specifically that no distinction should be made concerning com-
missioned works.8 6
The second major work concerning the revision was a report
submitted in 1961 by Abraham L. Kaminstein, who was then
Register of Copyrights.8 ' His report recommended that no
change be made to the general "works made for hire" rules,
arguing that "[i]n the case of a work made for hire (defined as a
work created for an employer by an employee within the regu-
lar scope of his employment), the employer should have the
right to secure copyright." 8 Kaminstein did, however, advo-
cate change regarding commissioned works, since he went on to
recommend that "[i]n the case of any other commissioned work
[excluding portraits], the author [should] have that right unless
expressly assigned.
'89
85. STUDY No. 13, supra note 12, at 140. The Supreme Court defined the limits of
the "shop right" doctrine in United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178
(1960), saying, "Where [an employee] [(1)] during his hours of employment, [(2)]
working with his [employer's] materials and appliances, [(3)] conceives and [(4)] per-
fects an invention for which he obtains a patent, he must accord his [employer] a
nonexclusive right to practice the invention." Id. at 188. For further discussion of the
"shop right" doctrine, see 35 U.S.C.S. § 261, nn. 100-44 (Law. Co-op 1981 & Supp. 1987);
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PATENT PRACTICE AND INVENTION MANAGEMENT 731-35
(1964). See also Angel & Tannenbaum, supra note 12, at 32 n.11 (citing Discussion
and Comments on the Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of
the U.S. Copyright Law, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2, 154 (1963) [hereinafter 1963 Discus-
sion]; Annotation, Application and Effect of "Shop Right Rule" or Licen~e Giving
Employer Limited Rights in Employees'Innovations and Discoveries, 61 A.L.R.2d 356
(1958); Note, supra note 12, at 285; STUDY No. 13, supra note 12, at 140.
86. See STUDY No. 13, supra note 12, at 149-55 (subsection entitled Comments and
Views Submitted to the Copyright Office on Works Made for Hire and on Commis-
sion). One of the few early advocates of change was Professor Melville Nimmer, who,
until his recent death, was regarded as the leading authority on copyright law in the
United States. See id. at 153-54.
87. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE
GENERAL REVISION OF THE UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT LAW, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961) [hereinafter 1961 REPORT]; see also KAMINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 335; Deutsch,
supra note 12, at 441-42.
88. See 1961 REPORT, supra note 87. See also KAMINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 335;
Deutsch, supra note 12, at 442.
89. See supra note 88.
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Between 1961 and 1964, there were numerous panel discus-
sions sponsored by the Copyright Office in which representa-
tives from a wide range of industries affected by the revisions
participated.9 ° Representatives of authors, screenwriters, and
composers advocated greater rights for those creating the
works, while representatives of publishers and the motion pic-
ture industry generally advocated restraint in changing the
"works made for hire" doctrine.91
In 1965, a revised bill,92 which for the first time conditioned
the "work made for hire" status of a commissioned work on the
type or category of work being considered, was submitted to
Congress.93 The bill attempted to change the "works made for
hire" definition to include "a work specially ordered or com-
missioned to be used as a contribution to a collective work, as
part of a motion picture, as a translation, or as a supplementary
work, if the parties expressly agree in writing that the work
shall be considered a work made for hire."94
The Register's Supplementary Report, which commented on
the bill, states that the "works made for hire" definition is a
"carefully worked out compromise aimed at balancing legiti-
mate interests on both sides."95 It also noted that the additional
requirement of a writing, which is included in the 1976 Act,96
was considered but discarded as useless because authors could
easily be forced into signing away their rights.97 Extensive
hearings on the bill were held in both Houses, but the 89th
Congress adjourned before further action could be taken.98
90. See Legislative History, supra note 3, at 47.
91. See KAMINSTEIN, supra note 12; Angel & Tannenbaum, supra note 12, at 31
n.10 (citing Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831 and H.R. 6835, Before Sub-
comm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1966)
[hereinafter Hearings]). See also O'Meara, supra note 12, at 526; Note, supra note 12,
at 284-85.
92. H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); see also KAMINSTEIN, supra note 12, at
355; Deutsch, supra note 12, at 442.
93. H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); see also KAMINSTEIN, supra note 12, at
355; Deutsch, supra note 12, at 442-43.
94. See supra note 93.
95. See Deutsch, supra note 12, at 443, (citing COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART VI
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION
OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 66 (1965) [hereinafter REGISTER'S
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT]).
96. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
97. REGISTER'S SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 95, at 67; see also Deutsch,
supra note 12, at 443.
98. 'See Legislative History, supra note 3, at 48.
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It is interesting to note that the concept of a compromise be-
tween creators and employers resurfaces in several official re-
ports as part of the legislative history.99 The comments and
criticisms made by several private interest groups during the
committee hearings now part of the record, 100 strongly suggest
that lobbying from the various industries affected by the doc-
trine was in large part responsible for shaping the current
law.' For example, House of Representatives Report No.
1476,102 which is considered to be the official legislative history
of the 1976 Act,0 3 states that the amendments proposed by the
representatives of the screenwriters and composers were con-
sidered but rejected as unworkable. The amendments again
suggested the use of the "shop right" doctrine found in patent
law. 104
Between the submission of the 1965 bill and the enactment of
the 1975 bill,0 5 many similar bills and committee reports were
approved but unsuccessfully sent through Congress.0 6 It was
not until Senate Bill 22 was introduced in 1975 that enough con-
gressional support was gathered to incorporate the proposed
changes into the bill, which was signed by President Ford on
October 19, 1976.107
D. The 1976 Revision
During the process of revising the 1909 copyright statute, two
important changes were considered in the "works made for
hire" area. The first change dealt with the scope of the em-
ployer's copyright in relation to employee-created work. The
second change was a much larger and totally new concept to
99. Compare REGISTER'S SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 95, at 66, with Leg-
islative History, supra note 3, at 121.
100. See Legislative History, supra note 3, at 121.
101. Id. See also supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
102. Legislative History, supra note 3.
103. See, e.g., Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984); see also Comment, Free Lance Artists, Works For
Hire, and the Copyright Act of 1976, 15 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 703, 707-08 (1982); Note,
supra note 12, at 273.
104. See Legislative History, supra note 3, at 121. See also supra notes 84-85 and
accompanying text.
105. S. 22, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); see also Angel & Tannenbaum, supra note 12,
at 29.
106. See Legislative History, supra note 3, at 48-50; see generally KAMINSTEIN,
supra note 12, at 345-77.
107. S. 22, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
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statutory protection: recognizing the rights of the independent
contractor as a new category of creator.
In the early revision discussions of the 1909 Act, a modifica-
tion to the basic "works made for hire" theory was proposed. It
suggested that the employee/author retain some rights in his
creation in contexts outside the scope of his employer's busi-
ness.1 08 Representatives of various authors' lobbying groups
urged that the employer be given the exclusive right to use the
employee-created work only in direct relation to his legitimate
business interests, with the employee retaining the rights in all
non-competitive areas.10 9 This proposal was based on the analo-
gous patent law theory of "shop right," which allows an em-
ployee to retain rights in his inventions under similar
conditions." 0
The idea of limiting the employer's ownership by splitting
the copyright was not new to the post-1909 Act's revisions. A
memorandum draft bill of March 2, 19061" had suggested an
even narrower definition than the one based on non-competi-
tion. It proposed that "works made for hire" should be limited
to "works produced by an employee during the hours for which
his salary is paid.""' 2 This suggestion, however, did not find its
way into the 1909 Act.
The suggestion to limit the employer's rights based on the
"shop right" analogy was not accepted during the revision dis-
cussions," 3 but in a somewhat altered form, limitations were
eventually incorporated into what became the 1976 Act."4 The
Act confines "made for hire" status to those works "prepared
by an employee within the scope of his or her employment.""'
This means that, absent a written agreement to the contrary,
any works which are produced as part of an employee's regular
108. See 1963 Discussion, supra note 85 (statements in opposition to the sugges-
tions put forth in the Register's Supplementary Report); see also KAMINSTEIN, supra
note 12, at 332-33.
109. See Hearings, supra note 91.
110. Id. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
111. STUDY No. 13, supra note 12, at 128 n. 4.
112. Id.
113. See Legislative History, supra note 3, at 121. Although the limitation of the
employer's rights was officially suggested as early as 1958 (in STUDY No. 13) it was not
incorporated into any of the later, revised bills. The final version of the revision did
attempt to limit the employer's rights, but it made no analogy to patent law. See S. 22,
94th Cong., 2d Sess., § 101 (1976); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
114. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
115. Id. (emphasis added).
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duties belong to his employer."6 However, absent a clear test
to determine when a work is "within the scope of employ-
ment," this rule still results in great uncertainty because the
parties to an employment relationship rarely put into writing
beforehand the exact nature of the employment, or the nature
of works which are to be regarded as emanating from the em-
ployment." 7 As one court has pointed out, "no one sells or
mortgages all the products of his brain to his employer by the
mere fact of employment."1
8
The more significant issue in revising the "works made for
hire" doctrine for the 1976 Act involved the status of the in-
dependent contractor. The main problem in this area was de-
termining when an independent contractor's work should be
classified as "made for hire.""' 9
The legislative history of the 1976 Act seems to indicate that
Congress was intent on protecting the rights of independent
contractors. 2 ° It reads:
The status of works prepared on special order or commission
was a major issue in the development of the definition of
"works made for hire" in section 101, which has undergone ex-
tensive revision during the legislative process. The basic prob-
lem is how to draw a statutory line between those works
written on special order or commission that should be consid-
ered as "works made for hire," and those that should not. The
definition now provided by the bill represents a compromise
which, in effect, spells out those special categories of commis-
sioned works that can be considered "works made for hire"
under certain circumstances.12'
Unlike the 1909 Act, the 1976 revision attempted to define a
"work made for hire;' 1 22 in doing so, it considered separately
works made by "employees" and those "specially commis-
sioned" from independent contractors. 23 The 1976 Act specifi-
cally enumerates nine categories under which commissioned
116. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 12, § 5.03[B][1][b], at 5-14 to 5-18.
117. Id. See also Angel & Tannenbaum, supra note 12, at 44.
118. Public Affairs Assoc. v. Rickover, 177 F. Supp. 601, 604 (D.D.C. 1959), rev'd on
other grounds, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C.. Cir. 1960), vacated for insufficient record, 369 U.S.
111 (1962).
119. Id. See Legislative History, supra note 3, at 121.
120. See Legislative History, supra note 3, at 121.
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. 17 U.S.C. § 101; cf. 1909 Act § 26. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
123. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see generally Legislative History, supra note 3, at 121.
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works are to be considered "for hire." '24 These include "(1)
contributions to a collective work,E12 53 (2) parts of a motion pic-
tureE1261 or other audiovisual work,E1271 (3) translations, (4) sup-
plementary works, 2 s1 (5) compilations,129' (6) instructional
texts,E131 (7) tests, (8) answer materials for a test, and (9)
atlases.' ' 1
The 1976 Act goes even further in limiting the commissioned
works which can be considered "for hire" by stating that even if
a commissioned work falls within one of these categories, it still
will not receive a "for hire" classification unless "the parties
expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that
the work shall be considered a work made for hire.'
32
Unfortunately, when compiling the single "works made for
hire" definition, Congress failed to clearly differentiate the two
separate problems which it had considered during the revision
process. The distinction between employees and independent
contractors is still uncertain and leaves room for varied inter-
pretations.1 33 In an effort to clarify and codify a complex doc-
trine, Congress has left the courts with an ambiguous and
confusing statute.
II
Interpretations of the 1976 Act
Early commentators on the changes to the "works made for
hire" doctrine in the 1976 Act pointed out that Congress had
done much to resolve the ambiguities that had confused the
ownership issue of works created by independent contrac-
tors.' Even though Congress created a statutory "works made
124. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see also supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
125. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see supra note 28.
126. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see supra note 29.
127. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see supra note 30.
128. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see supra note 31.
129. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see supra note 32.
130. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see supra note 33.
131. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
132. Id. See also 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 12, § 5.03[B][2][b], at 5-20 to 5-21.
133. See, e.g., Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 323; Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Sys.
Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 434 (1986); Aldon Accessories
Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984); Iris Arc v.
S. S. Sarna, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). See generally O'Meara, supra note
12.
134. See Angel & Tannenbaum, supra note 12, at 239; 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 12,
§ 5.03[B][2][c], at 5-21 to 5-25; Note, supra note 12, at 273. See, e.g., Childers v. High
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for hire" definition, there was still room for confusion since
neither the Act nor its legislative history supplied clear defini-
tions of the Act's essential terms: "employee," "scope of em-
ployment," and "work specially ordered or commissioned"
(referring to work made by an independent contractor). 135
These ambiguous definitions have raised two interrelated ques-
tions in applying the "works made for hire" doctrine: 1) can
"works specially ordered or commissioned," those created by
independent contractors, only be classified as "for hire" if they
fall into one of the enumerated categories and are expressly
made "for hire" in a writing?'36 and 2) are employees and in-
dependent contractors two distinct groups of creators, the first
covered exclusively by subsection (1) of the statutory definition
and the other exclusively by subsection (2)? 131
As a result of these uncertainties in the statute, it can be dif-
ficult to determine whether an individual should be considered
an employee or a contractor, and, if a contractor, whether his.
category of work is meant to be considered "for hire.' 3  As the
Supreme Court wrote in 1944, there is a view that:
"common-law standards" are those 'the courts have applied in
distinguishing between "employees" and "independent con-
tractors" when working out various problems .... The argu-
ment assumes that there is some simple, uniform and easily
applicable test which the courts have used, in dealing with
such problems, to determine whether persons doing work for
others fall in one class or the other. Unfortunately this is not
true.
139
It is generally recognized that there are two major opposing
positions regarding what qualifies as a "work made for hire"
under the 1976 Act.14 0 These contrasting views highlight the
Soc'y Magazine, 557 F. Supp. 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (where the court held that a photog-
rapher is an independent contractor and his work should not be considered "work
made for hire" absent an express written agreement), discussed in Latman, Works
Made for Hire, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 18, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
135. See 17 U.S.C. § 101; see also Legislative History, supra note 3, at 121.
136. See, e.g., Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 328-31 (discussing the two interpreta-
tions); O'Meara, supra note 12, at 525-34; Note, supra note 12, at 274-75; cf N. BOOR-
STYN, supra note 38, § 3.3, at 85-86.
137. See Aldon 738 F.2d at 552-53; Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 328; O'Meara, supra
note 12, at 527.
138. See, e.g., Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 323" Evans Newton, 793 F.2d at 889;
Aldon, 738 F.2d at 54&" Iris Arc, 621 F. Supp. at 916.
139. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 120 (1944).
140. See, e.g., O'Meara, supra note 12, at 523; Note, supra note 12, at 274-75; Easter
Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 328.
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present disagreement among federal circuit courts. 141
A. The Literal View
Using a literal interpretation of the wording of the 1976 Act,
which is the method advocated by Professor Nimmer,142 a com-
missioned work can only be considered "made for hire" if it sat-
isfies both of the following statutory requirements: (1) it must
fall into one of the enumerated categories;143 and (2) there must
be a signed writing expressly stating the parties' intention that
the work be made "for hire."'14 4 According to this strict stan-
dard, if either of these elements is missing, the commissioned
work cannot be a "work made for hire. '1 45 A failure to meet
the standard would ordinarily result in the creator, and not the
hiring party, being considered the "author" and copyright
owner.1
46
In May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Associates, 147 where an ar-
chitect sued for alleged copyright infringement of his drawings,
the Ninth Circuit, in dicta, followed this literal interpretation
standard. The court noted that, in promulgating the 1976 Act,
"Congress [had] changed the copyright law in its entirety.'
' 48
The court stated that May was "an independent contractor
rather than an employee, so under Section 101, May's drawings
would not be subject to the 'work for hire' doctrine, both be-
cause of the absence of a written agreement so providing, and
141. Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 323; Evans Newton, 793 F.2d at 889; Aldon, 738
F.2d at 548.
142. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 12, § 5.03[B][2][a], at 5-19 to 5-20; see also N. BOOR-
STYN, supra note 38, § 3.3, at 85-86; but see O'Meara, supra note 12, at 526-27 (labeling
the method "radical" since it called for a drastic change from the pre-1976
presumption).
143. See supra notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
144. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see also 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 12, § 5.03[B][2][b], at 5-20.
145. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 12, § 5.03[B][2][b], at 5-20; Angel & Tannenbaum,
supra note 12, at 56; N. BOORSTYN, supra note 38, § 3.3, at 85-86; O'Meara, supra note
12, at 526-27 (radical interpretation); but see O'Meara, supra note 12, at 527-28 (con-
servative interpretation); Simon, supra note 47, at 492.
146. The literal interpretation is implicit in a number of cases. See, e.g., May v.
Morganelli-Heumann & Assocs., 618 F.2d 1363, 1368 n.4 (9th Cir. 1980); Whelan As-
socs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab, 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1319 (D.C. Pa. 1985), aff'd on other
grounds, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987); Everts v.
Arkham House Publishers, 579 F. Supp. 145, 148 (W.D. Wis. 1984); Childers v. High
Soc'y Magazine, 557 F. Supp. 978, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); BPI Sys. v. Leith, 532 F. Supp.
208, 210 (W.D. Tex. 1981); Mister B. Textiles v. Woodcrest Fabrics, 523 F. Supp. 21, 24
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 854-55 (D.N.J. 1981).
147. 618 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1980).
148. Id. at 1368 n.4.
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because the drawings do not fall within one of the prescribed
categories of work." '149
The main weakness of this argument, stressed by opponents
of this strict standard, is that if Congress had specifically de-
sired such a drastic change in the existing law, there would
have been a stronger indication of this intention - either in the
wording of the revision itself, or in its legislative history. In-
stead of ambiguous congressional records and hearing reports,
there should have been a clear statement of purpose.1 50
While Congress may have attempted to compromise among
the various competing interests, its stated intent was to change
the status of commissioned works by providing a definition
which "spells out those specific categories of commissioned
works that can be considered 'works made for hire'.... ",151 As
one court recently held, "this interpretation makes sense out
of the nine narrow categories in section 101(2): The nine cate-
gories are statutory permission to allow certain kinds of in-
dependent contractors to sign away their authorship to their
buyers.1 52 This view appears even more sensible when com-
pared to the earlier revision attempt, which had defined a
"work made for hire" as "work prepared by an employee
within the scope of the duties of his employment, but not in-
cluding a work made on special order--or commission.'"153
Seen in this light, Congress obviously did consider the 1976 Act
to be an "extensive revision" of the existing "works made for
hire" presumption, even if it failed to clarify exactly what the
revised presumption is and how it should be applied.'
B. The Aldon Approach
Other recent court decisions have reinforced the preexisting
149. Id. The action had originally been filed prior to the adoption of the 1976 revi-
sions. Since the 1976 Act is not retroactive, the court was forced to apply the pre-1976
standards to the facts of the case, thereby making its earlier analysis dicta. This dicta,
however, may be persuasive since the Ninth Circuit has not, to date, ruled in this area.
150. See, e.g., Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 330-31; Aldon, 738 F.2d at 552; see also
O'Meara, supra note 12, at 533.
151. Legislative History, supra note 3, at 121.
152. Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 335 (emphasis added).
153. See S. 3008, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1964) (emphasis added); see also COPYRIGHT
LAW REVISION, PT.3, DIscussIONS AND COMMENTS ON THE PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF
THE REVISED UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT LAW 15 n.11 (1964); KAMINSTEIN, supra note
12, at 351 n.11; Comment, supra note 103, at 709.
154. See Legislative History, supra note 3, at 121; Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 331.
See also supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
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"works made for hire" presumption, which seems to directly
oppose the literal view. In Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel,
Inc.,'5 the Second Circuit held:
It does not matter [in categorizing a work as "for hire"]
whether the for-hire creator is an employee in the sense of
having a regular job with the hiring author. What matters is
whether the hiring author caused the work to be made and ex-
ercised the right to direct and supervise the creation.
15 6
The Seventh Circuit, in Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Systems
Software,"7 has followed the Aldon court's finding.' 5 These
courts viewed Congress' 1976 changes to the "works made for
hire" language merely as a rewording of the existing presump-
tion."9 Their rulings reestablished the definition of a "work
made for hire" based on the old test of employer/hiring party
supervision and control even though the employee/contractor
was not a regular or formal employee. 6 °
The Aldon court pointed out that if an independent contrac-
tor is working under the supervision and control of the hiring
party, the contractor is, in fact, acting as an employee of the
hiring party and should be statutorily classified as such.' 6 1 In
bringing the contractor under the same scrutiny as is used for
an "employee within the scope of his employment,' 1 62 the Al-
don court created a loophole which allowed it to avoid asking
.the statutory questions whether the work fits within one of
the nine enumerated categories of commissioned works, and
whether there is a signed writing.163
155. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
156. Aldon, 738 F.2d at 551.
157. 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 434 (1986).
158. Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889, 894 n.5 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 434 (1986) (citing Aldon).
159. Aldon, 738 F.2d at 552; Evans Newton, 793 F.2d at 894; see also Iris Arc v. S.S.
Sarna, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 916, 919 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). The Aldon court explained that
"nothing in the 1976 Act or its legislative history indicates that Congress intended to
dispense with this prior law ... " Aldon, 738 F.2d at 552.
160. Aldon, 738 F.2d at 552; Evans Newton, 793 F.2d at 894. The Aldon court stated:
Under the 1909 Act and decisions construing it, if an employee supervised
and directed the work, an employer-employee relationship could be found
even though the employee was not a regular or formal employee .... [W]e
believe and hold that Congress intended the prior law in such situations to
remain unchanged.
Aldon, 738 F.2d at 552.
161. Aldon, 738 F.2d at 552-53; cf. Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 331-34 (referred to
separately as the "Aldon Accessories Compromise").
162. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (subsection (1) of the "works made for hire" definition).
163. Id. § 101 (subsection (2) of the "works made for hire" definition).
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Recently, the Fifth Circuit, in Easter Seal Society v. Playboy
Enterprises,16 4 specifically rejected the Aldon approach. 6 ' It
suggested that the Aldon court may have been forced into its
position in order to avoid a seemingly unjust result given the
facts of that case. 66
The Easter Seal Society court also pointed out that the "exer-
cise of supervision and control" test, which the Aldon court re-
vived, is ultimately unreliable since it is a subjective test left to
the discretion of the court and cannot be predicted with suffi-
cient accuracy by the parties during the course of their business
relationship. 16 7 The court stated, "The rule of Aldon Accesso-
ries makes business arrangements exceedingly difficult ...
[T]he 'actual control' test.., makes the outcome of 'work for
hire' analysis too fact-specific for each work and therefore less
predictable .... ",168 This test undermines the idea of consis-
tency inherent in a "doctrine" since the results can vary unpre-
dictably with each transaction.
169
The Easter Seal Society court also found a third problem with
the Aldon court's reasoning. The Fifth Circuit, stating that
"any [employer] satisfying a seriously enforced 'actual control'
test will ordinarily be a co-author of the work... ,"170 suggested
an analysis that the Aldon Court seemed to have overlooked.
Instead of fighting over which party - the contractor, or the
hiring party - owns the copyright in a new work, a court could
simply compel the parties to share ownership. If an employer/
hiring party sufficiently participates in creating the work,
whether in conjunction with an employee (regardless of
whether or not within the scope of his employment), or with an
independent contractor, the employer would be considered a
164. 815 F.2d at 323.
165. Id. at 334. The Easter Seal Society court analyzed the Aldon decision and rea-
soned that, "There is simply no way to milk the 'actual control' test of Aldon Accesso-
ries from the language of the statute .... Therefore, we reject the rule of Aldon
Accessories." Id.
166. Id. at 333. The Easter Seal Society court pointed out that:
The "work for hire" issue in Aldon Accessories arose as a defensive tactic
adopted by a third-party infringer to dispute the validity of the plaintiff's
copyright. This posture makes the "literal" reading of the 1976 Act particu-
larly unattractive, because it is the infringer and not the independent con-
tractor who will benefit from a ruling that the work was not made "for hire."
Id.
167. Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 333-34.
168. Id.
169. See id.
170. Id. at 333.
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co-author of a "joint work." '7 In the case of a "joint work,"
both co-authors are given equal rights in the work and each can
exercise any of the protections granted to individual authors
under copyright law.'72 This was the result in Mister B. Textiles
v. Woodcrest Fabrics.'
Finally, the Easter Seal Society court pointed out that while
the Aldon court discussed the doctrine as based on the actual
exercise of the employer's right of supervision and control,'74
there is a strong likelihood that the rule will revert back to the
old presumption that the employer merely has the right, with
no requirement that he actually exercise it.175
The Easter Seal Society court demonstrated that this is not
simply pessimistic speculation by referring to the Seventh Cir-
cuit case, Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Systems Software.176
In that case, the appellate court was unable to find any specific
evidence in the trial record that the hiring party actually con-
trolled the work done by the contractor; 77 however, after quot-
ing the test as set out in Aldon,178 the Seventh Circuit refused
to overturn the lower court's finding that the work was "for
hire" and therefore belonged to the hiring party. 79
C. The Easter Seal Society Compromise
The Fifth Circuit, in Easter Seal Society, suggested a solution
which, in effect, is a compromise between the Aldon approach
and the literal standard. After a lengthy examination of alter-
native approaches,8 ° the court held that a work is "made for
hire" if and only if. 1) the contractor is an employee within
the meaning of agency law,' 8' which would bring the work
171. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see, e.g., Mister B. Textiles v. Wood-
crest Fabrics, 523 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
172. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(a); see, e.g., Mister B. Textiles. 523 F. Supp. at 21;
Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 457 F.2d
1213 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972).
173. Mister B. Textiles, 523 F. Supp. at 24.
174. See Aldon, 738 F.2d at 552-53.
175. See Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 334.
176. 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 434 (1986); see Easter Seal Soc'y,
815 F.2d at 334.
177. See Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 334.
178. Id. Evans Newton, 793 F.2d at 894.
179. Evans Newton, 793 F.2d at 894.
180. See Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 329-34.
181. Id. at 334-35. Because adopting state agency law would not give copyright law
the requisite national uniformity, federal courts can turn to the general principles
embodied in section 220 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, when considering
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under the "employee" section of the statutory definition;8 2 or
2) the hiring party and the contractor strictly comply with the
requirements of the "commissioned works" section of the
statute.8 3
The Restatement (Second) of Agency Law, which may be said
to summarize "general common law,"'81 4 provides guidelines for
defining an "employee" and includes criteria for differentiating
between an "employee" and an "independent contractor.'
18 5
The Easter Seal Society court reasoned that using this guide of-
fers the greatest stability and uniformity since the test for de-
termining an "employee" is based on established principles of
law, and will afford contracting parties more predictability
when structuring agreements.8 6
cases based on the "work made for hire" doctrine. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 12,
§ 5.03 [B][1], at 5-12 to 5-13. The Restatement reads:
§ 220 Definition of Servant
(1) A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of an-
other and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the
services is subject to the other's control or right to control.
(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an in-
dependent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are
considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise
over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the
work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist
without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities,
tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the
employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of
master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958) (includes comments and illustrations
provided by the American Law Institute).
182. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (subsection (1) of the "works made for hire" definition); Easter
Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 334-35.
183. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (subsection (2) of the "works made for hire" definition); Easter
Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 334-35.
184. See Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 335 n.19 (discussing use of the Restatements
as "general common law").
185. See Restatement (Second) of Agency, supra note 181, § 220.
186. Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 335.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.
III
Further Revision
A. The Need for Consistency
The problem of determining copyright ownership of a work
created by one party at the behest of another is dependent on
whether the work is classified as "made for hire," which in turn
is dependent on whether the creator is classified as a statutory
employee. The lack of clear definitions in the 1976 Act, and of
any other decisive guidelines for making these determinations,
indicates the need for further revision to increase the effective-
ness of the current copyright statute.
While no clear rule for deciding whether a creator is an em-
ployee or an independent contractor is currently favored, there
is a trend among commentators and recent cases toward the use
of agency law in this context. Professor Nimmer suggested us-
ing the Restatement (Second) of Agency 8 7 as a source since it
provides some helpful criteria for testing the "master-servant"
relationship.1 8 The Easter Seal Society court also based its so-
lution on the use of agency law.189 Even the Aldon court found
this a valid suggestion, although it never actually included a re-
view of agency law in its opinion. 90
With the modern trend toward greater proliferation of in-
dependent contractors in the technology fields 9 ' and the rap-
idly changing copyright laws in that area, 9 2 the need for clear
guidelines regarding copyright ownership is critical under the
"works made for hire" doctrine. Legislative action should be
taken that will provide copyright owners and the courts a clear
vision of what should be done.
B. Attempted Legislative Revisions Since 1976
Attempts at revising and clarifying the 1976 Act have been
187. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 12, § 5.03[B][1], at 5-12 & n.13.1 (suggesting the
use of section 220 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency).
188. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
189. See Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 335.
190. See Aldon, 738 F.2d at 552 (citing 1 M. NIMMER).
191. See, e.g., Evans Newton, 793 F.2d at 889; see also Surrel, The Treatment of Com-
puter Software as Works Made for Hire Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 5 COMPUTER
L.J. 579 (1985); Raysman & Brown, Computer Copyrights: "Work Made for Hire,"
N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
192. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14 (Supp. III 1985) (known as the Semiconductor Chip Protec-
tion Act) (added to Copyright Act in 1984).
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made on both the state and federal levels. Since the federal
statute is confusing, some states have tried to enact their own
definitions in order to standardize the application of the federal
statute in their courts. For example, the California Legislature
amended its Labor Code in 1978193 to include a definition of
"employee" for the purpose of "works made for hire." The stat-
ute reads:
"Employee" includes . . . [a]ny person while engaged by con-
tract for the creation of a specially ordered or commissioned
work of authorship in which the parties expressly agree in a
written instrument signed by them that the work shall be con-
sidered a work made for hire, as defined in Section 101 of Title
17 of the United State [sic] Code, and the ordering or commis-
sioning party obtains ownership of all the rights comprised in
the copyright in the work.194
California has also adopted these "works made for hire" provi-
sions for the purpose of determining the employer-employee
relationship in connection with its Unemployment Insurance
Code.195
Similar legislation has been introduced in New York. A 1980
bill 196 would have amended the New York General Business
Law to read:
Any contract for the creation of a specially ordered or commis-
sioned work of art that is stated to create a work-for-hire rela-
tionship between the artist making the work of art and the
193. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3351.5(c) (West Supp. 1987).
194. Id.
195. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 601.5, 606.5, 621, 656, 686 (West Supp. 1987). Section
601.5 defines "employment" as follows:
For purpose of this division only, "employment" includes any service in an
artistic or literary capacity performed by an individual pursuant to a collec-
tive bargaining agreement between an employer and a labor organization in
the motion picture, radio or television industry where the employer has the
right to control and direct the services to be performed and the individual is
defined as an employee under the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement.
CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 601.5. Section 686 defines "employer" as follows:
"Employer" also means any person contracting for the creation of a specially
ordered or commissioned work of authorship when the parties expressly
agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be consid-
ered a work made for hire, as defined in Section 101 of Title 17 of the United
States Code, and the ordering or commissioning party obtains ownership of
all of the rights comprised in the copyright in the work. The ordering or
commissioning party shall be the employer of the author of the work for the
purposes of this part.
Id. § 686 (footnote omitted).
196. N.Y. Assembly Bill 10010 (March 4, 1980).
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ordering or commissioning party shall automatically give to
the artist the status of an employee under the laws of the state
of New York with respect to that transaction. 9 7
This bill failed to make it out of committee despite strong sup-
port. There are plans, however, to reintroduce a modified ver-
sion of the bill following the success of the California
legislation. 9 8
However, since the federal copyright statute preempts state
law,199 proper revision on the federal level would be more ap-
propriate. Since 1982, several bills proposing changes have
been introduced in Congress. The first bill, submitted by Sena-
tor Chad Cochran (D-Miss.) in 1982,200 proposed altering the
second clause of the "works made for hire" definition. The bill
merely attempted to delete several of the enumerated catego-
ries in order to broaden a creator's rights.2"' The bill sought to
strike out the sections of the definition referring to "a contribu-
tion to a collective work; a part of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work; ... instructional text; and ... indexes.' ' 202 It
"died," however, in the Senate subcommittee at the end of the
congressional session. Cochran introduced another similar bill
in 1983,203 but this one also failed to win Senate approval. In
1984, Representative Barney Frank (D-Mass.) introduced a bill
in the House identical to Cochran's 1983 proposal, 0 4 but this
197. Id.
198. Barry, Legislative Proposals for "Works for Hire," N.Y.L.J., May 18, 1984, at
5, col. 1.
199. Section 301 of the 1976 Act provides for a single federal copyright system, and
indicates which state laws are preempted by that system. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). Two
conditions must be met to preempt state law. First, the right regulated by state law
must be "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copy-
right as specified by section 106." Id. § 301(a). Second, the right must be "in works of
authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the
subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103." Id. See also Com-
ment, supra note 88, at 717.
200. S. 2044, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
201. The text of the bill, in pertinent part, read as follows:
[S]ection 101 of Title 17, United States Code, is amended in clause (2) of the
definition of "work made for hire" by -
(1) striking out "as a contribution to a collective work, as part of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work;"
(2) striking out "as an instructional text;" and




203. S. 2138, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
204. H.R. 5911, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
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also stalled in committee due to lack of support.
Most recently, Senator Cochran submitted a third bill to the
99th Congress which revised his last effort.2"5 This bill repre-
sented a better-focused attempt to resolve the uncertainties left
after the Aldon decision. It proposed to qualify the definition
of "work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or
her employment" 20 6 by adding a phrase allowing the category
to apply only where the "employee" is provided with full bene-
fits and incidents of employment according to applicable state
and federal law, including withholding taxes.20 7 Such a change
would serve to sharpen the distinction between regular em-
ployees and independent contractors. Unfortunately, this bill
also stalled in subcommittee at the end of the congressional ses-
sion, but is expected to resurface in the 100th Congress.
20 8
Conclusion
The 1976 Act's simplification of the "works made for hire"
doctrine only further cluttered it. In works created in the em-
ployment context, distinguishing between employees and in-
dependent contractors in determining the initial ownership of
copyright is crucial. It ultimately remains for the trier of fact
to make the distinction. Because of the recent conflicting cir-
cuit court decisions, however, the criteria are now unclear;
court decisions have, as a result, become unpredictable. Clearly,
greater uniformity is needed.
To remedy the situation, either Congress needs to further re-
vise the copyright statute to more clearly define the goals and
expected effects of the doctrine (by better defining the mean-
ings of "employee," "scope of employment," and "works spe-
cially ordered or commissioned"), or the Supreme Court could
render an opinion settling the dispute among the circuits. The
"works made for hire" doctrine can only be effective if parties
can predict their rights and obligations, and the doctrine can
only meet these goals through clarity in its wording and
application.
Senator Cochran's latest attempt to clarify these defini-
205. S. 2330, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
206. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
207. See S. 2330, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); see also 32 Pat. Trademark & Copy-
right J. (BNA) no. 778, 10, 18 (May 1, 1986).
208. See 1986-87 Legislative Review and Outlook, 33 Pat. Trademark & Copyright
J.(BNA) no. 816, 320 (Feb. 5, 1987).
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tions209 would go far toward eliminating the Aldon loophole of
reclassifying contractors as statutory employees.21 ° The Easter
Seal Society court's suggestion of judging the "employee-in-
dependent contractor" status on a combination of agency prin-
ciples and the category and writing requirements currently
existing in the copyright statute would also afford a workable
solution.21' Neither, however, has gained the needed legislative
or judicial support.
The Supreme Court's recent attention to the Easter Seal So-
ciety case indicates that it may soon decide to unify the applica-
tion of the doctrine. This would go far in restoring its
predictability and therefore its usefulness. However, instead of
simply clarifying the doctrine's effect, the better solution would
be for the statute itself to be made more understandable. Con-
gress should act to revise the law. Major corporate employers,
who exert a strong influence in Congress through lobbying, are
not going to simply stand by and let the valuable "bundle of
rights"2 2 inherent in copyright ownership slip away after de-
cades of control.213 It may be too simplistic to portray this
struggle as one between the powerful corporation and the indi-
vidual artist, but at least in the sense of having the power to
.effect change the analogy is appropriate.
Until legislative and judicial reforms bring greater consis-
tency into the application of the "works made for hire" doc-
trine, perhaps the only realistic solution is to educate the
individuals that do business in the various industries that are
affected by this dilemma. Whether or not an employer-em-
ployee relationship exists becomes a moot issue if an independ-
ent contractor expressly reserves all copyrights when entering
into a contract.21 4 If the hiring party then wants to obtain these
rights, he can negotiate for them at the start of the relationship.
The rights involved in the copyright would in essence become
part of the bargained-for consideration of the contract and
209. See supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 155-63 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 180-86 and accompanying text.
212. See N. BOORSTYN, supra note 38, at 97 (discussing the rights described in sec-
tion 106(1)-(5) of Title 17 of the United States Code).
213. The legislative history indicates that Congress recognized the author's need
for protection: "[P]rovision safeguarding authors ... is needed because of the unequal
bargaining position of authors, resulting in part from the impossibility of determining
a work's value until it has been exploited." Legislative History, supra note 3, at 124.
214. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982).
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copyright ownership would then be as certain as any other con-
tract provision.

